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Reality	in	a	soft	science:	
the	metaphonology	of	historical	reconstruction	ROGER	LASS	
Angus	McIntosh	Centre	for	Historical	Linguistics	
Abstract	All	 disciplines	 that	 deal	 with	 (apparent)	 recovery	 of	 objects	 from	 the	past	 are	 faced	 by	 a	 fundamental	 question:	 what	 is	 the	 metaphysical	status	of	these	objects?	Are	they	realia	of	some	kind,	or	are	they	merely	epistemic	objects	with	no	substance?	This	 could	be	 summed	up	 from	a	debate	 still	 going	 on	 in	 quantum	 physics:	 do	 quantum	 systems	 have	 a	real	existence,	or	are	they	merely	devices	for	calculation?	In	this	paper	I	sum	up	the	advantages	of	having	an	ontology,	and	the	disadvantages	of	assuming	that	reconstructed	linguistic	objects	are	not	real.	I	also	discuss	the	 uniformitarian	 position	 that	 makes	 this	 an	 unproblematic	 claim.	 I	also	deal	with	 the	neo-Saussurean	 claim	 that	 reconstructed	 items	have	no	reality	 in	 themselves,	but	solely	 in	 terms	of	 the	systems	they	are	 in;	and	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	position	(held	by	Meillet	and	Kuryłowicz	among	others),	is	fundamentally	perverse.			
	What	 is	 the	 status	 of	 the	 objects	 linguistic	 historians	 reconstruct	(segments,	phonetic	values,	etymological	pathways,	etc.)?	Are	they	the	pure	 ‘formulaic’	 constructs	 that	Meillet	 claimed	 famously	 he	 believed	they	were	(see	below)?	Or	could	they	have	true	ontological	value	as	in	the	 various	 kinds	 of	 realism	 practiced	 (usually	 unreflectively)	 by	historians?	 I	 engage	here	with	 three	main	 issues.	 First,	 do	 the	objects	we	 reconstruct	 form	 part	 of	 an	 ontology,	 or	 are	 they	 content-free	outputs	 of	 protocols?	 Second,	 given	 my	 more	 or	 less	 realist	 answer,	what	 is	 the	 ‘substance’	 that	 makes	 these	 outputs	 ontic?	 And	 third,	derivatively,	 what	 is	 the	 status	 of	 ‘indirect’	 reconstructions?	 For	instance,	projecting	a	common	ancestor	*k	 from	a	cognation	 [k]	 :	 [h],1	but	disallowing	a	direct	etymological	sequence	*k	>*h,	rather	claiming	the	 necessity	 or	 at	 least	 high	 desirability	 of	 an	 intervening	 *x.	 This	would	be	 required	by	 a	 kind	of	 ‘Darwinian’	 gradualism,	 supported	by																																																									
1	 Reconstructed	 items	 are	 starred.	 Where	 only	 phonetic	 characterisation	 and	 not	reconstructed	status	are	at	issue,	I	use	IPA	symbols	in	square	brackets.	
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	uniformitarianism.2	 Thus	 the	 longer	 etymology	 would	 be	 the	 null	hypothesis:	 in	 this	 context	 length	 =	 parsimony.	 (This	 would	 not	 be	 a	violation	of	Occam’s	Razor,	as	that	says	only	that	entities	should	not	be	multiplied	praeter	 necessitatem	 [beyond	necessity];	 and	 in	 this	 case	 it	might	be	that	the	addition	of	*x	to	the	etymological	chain	would	not	be	beyond	necessity,	but	derived	by	principle.)	The	 polar	 philosophical	 stances	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	 theory-created	objects	could	be	described	as:3		(a)	 Instrumental/Epistemic:	 theories	 are	merely	devices	 for	 calculation	and	do	not	generate	realia.4		(b)	 Realist/Ontic:	theories	generate	extra-mental	realia	of	some	kind.			This	dichotomy	was	the	underlying	issue	Galileo	came	to	grief	over;	he	 insisted	 that	 the	 heliocentric	 universe	was	 a	 real	 object,	 while	 his	adversary	 Cardinal	 Bellarmino	was	 happy	 to	 allow	 him	 to	 teach	 it	 as	long	as	he	didn’t	claim	that	it	was	real.	Galileo	nearly	went	to	the	stake	for	his	ontological	commitment;	he	did	spend	the	last	nine	years	of	his	life	 under	 house	 arrest	 for	 it.	 The	 issue	 is	 still	 with	 us:	 probably	 the	classic	 modern	 epistemic	 theory	 is	 the	 Copenhagen	 Interpretation	 of	quantum	 mechanics.	 This	 holds	 that	 attempts	 to	 penetrate	 the	mathematics	defining	the	wave	function5	are	pointless,	that	it	is	a	pure	calculating	instrument	(which	gets	the	answers	right	—	but	the	objects	or	states	that	appear	in	the	answer	have	no	existence	until	they’ve	been	observed).	 This	 stance,	 characterising	 the	 wave	 function	 as	 a	mathematical	abstraction	which	magically	produces	 the	right	answers	rather	 than	part	of	 the	world’s	 furniture,	 is	being	 fiercely	battled	by	a	
																																																								
2	 I	return	to	uniformitarianism	toward	the	end	of	this	paper.	For	now	I	define	it	this	way:	 ‘there	are	no	miracles	 […]	 the	principles	governing	 the	world	 (=	 the	domain	of	enquiry)	were	the	same	in	the	past	as	they	are	now’	(Lass	1997,	25:	italics	original).	3	This	dichotomy	is	 less	subtle	and	somewhat	different	from	the	one	used	in	current	philosophy	 of	 physics.	 But	 I	 think	 it	 is	 satisfactory	 for	 this	 linguistic	 discussion,	 in	which	quite	different	matters	arise.	For	the	issues	as	treated	in	current	philosophy	of	physics	see	Atmanspacher	(2002).	I	am	grateful	to	Julia	Questa	for	calling	this	paper	to	my	attention.	4	 Actually	 the	 modern	 definition	 of	 ‘epistemic’	 makes	 it	 less	 of	 a	 synonym	 for	‘instrumental’;	 to	 be	 precise,	 an	 epistemic	 theory	 is	 one	 consisting	 only	 of	 mental	representations	 —	 this	 does	 not	 actually	 imply	 instrumentalism	 sensu	 stricto.	 But	practically	being	ontology-free	is	what	counts	in	both	definitions.	5	 The	 wave	 function	 of	 a	 quantum	 system	 (e.g.	 a	 proton	 or	 an	 atom)	 is	 a	 variable	quantity	whose	 values	 predict	 the	 probabilities	 of	 the	 particle	 being	 in	 a	 particular	location	at	a	particular	time.	
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small	cadre	of	realists	(see	Meralli	2015).6	The	classic	ontic	theories	like	Einstein’s	General	and	Special	theories	of	relativity	and	Darwin’s	theory	of	 natural	 selection	 are	 intact.	 One	 day	 perhaps	 the	 ontic	 supporters	will	show	definitely	that	Schrödinger’s	cat	must	be	either	alive	or	dead	at	any	given	moment	regardless	of	observation	—	so	far	it	appears	not	to	 have	 happened.7	 The	 distinction	 is	 clearly	 laid	 out	 in	 Chakravartty	(2015,	section	1.2):		Semantically,	 realism	 is	 committed	 to	 a	 literal	 interpretation	 of	 scientific	claims	 about	 the	 world.	 In	 common	 parlance,	 realists	 take	 theoretical	statements	 at	 ‘face	 value’.	 According	 to	 realism,	 claims	 about	 scientific	entities,	processes,	properties,	and	relations,	whether	they	be	observable	or	unobservable,	should	be	construed	literally	as	having	truth	values,	whether	true	 or	 false.	 This	 semantic	 commitment	 contrasts	 primarily	with	 those	 of	so-called	instrumentalist	epistemologies	[…],	which	interpret	descriptions	of	unobservables	 simply	 as	 instruments	 for	 the	 prediction	 of	 observable	phenomena,	 or	 for	 systematizing	 observation	 reports.	 Traditionally,	instrumentalism	holds	that	claims	about	unobservable	things	have	no	literal	meaning	at	all	[…].8	
																																																								
6	There	is	a	competing	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics,	the	Many-Worlds	theory,	in	which	each	observation	produces	a	new	universe,	identical	to	the	one	in	which	the	observation	is	made	except	for	the	results	of	the	observation.		Since	by	definition	the	parallel	 universes	 are	not	 real	 in	our	 current	universe,	 and	do	not	pre-exist	but	 are	brought	 into	 existence	 by	 observation,	 this	 theory	 is	 probably	 epistemic.	 It	 is	 also	untestable	 as	 are	 most	 other	 interpretations	 of	 quantum	 mechanics,	 since	 they	 all	make	 the	 same	 (correct)	 predictions.	 The	 pioneering	 work	 in	 this	 area	 is	 the	exceedingly	difficult	and	technical	DeWitt	&	Graham	(1973).	There	is	a	more	popular	and	accessible	account	in	Gribbin	(2012:	ch.	11).		7	 Schrödinger’s	 cat	 is	 a	 thought	experiment	dating	 from	1935,	designed	 to	 illustrate	what	 the	 physicist	 Erwin	 Schrödinger	 took	 to	 be	 the	 paradoxical	 properties	 of	 the	Copenhagen	 Interpretation.	 A	 cat	 is	 shut	 in	 a	 box	with	 a	 radioactive	 substance,	 and	whether	or	not	the	substance	will	emit	a	particle	at	any	time	is	unpredictable	(this	is	a	general	statistical	property	of	radiation).	If	there	is	no	particle	emitted	the	cat	will	be	alive	 when	 you	 open	 the	 box,	 if	 a	 particle	 is	 emitted	 it	 will	 be	 dead.	 If	 quantum	superposition	 (existence	 of	 multiple	 simultaneous	 states)	 is	 possible,	 and	 the	Copenhagen	 interpretation	 is	 valid,	 then	 as	 long	 as	 the	box	 is	 closed	 the	 cat	 is	 both	alive	and	dead.	Its	final	state	can	be	known	only	when	an	observation	is	made.	8	This	view	 is	characterised	nicely	 in	a	 letter	of	Einstein	 (Jammer	1982,	73–4):	 “The	present	quantum	theory	is	unable	to	provide	the	description	of	a	real	state	of	physical	facts,	but	only	of	an	(incomplete)	knowledge	of	such.	Moreover,	the	very	concept	of	a	real	 factual	 state	 is	debarred	by	 the	orthodox	 theoreticians.	The	situation	arrived	at	corresponds	 almost	 exactly	 to	 that	 of	 the	 good	 old	 Bishop	 Berkeley.”	 (George	Berkeley,	 1685-1773,	 Bishop	 of	 Cloyne,	 was	 an	 Irish	 philosopher	who	 espoused	 an	extreme	 idealism,	 denying	 the	 existence	 of	 any	 material	 world:	 things	 come	 into	existence	only	as	a	result	of	their	being	perceived.)	
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	 There	 is	a	paradoxical	split	 in	our	 field.	On	the	one	hand,	 it	 is	and	probably	always	has	been	dominated	by	some	kind	of	realism	(if	not	as	an	 explicit	 theoretical	 tenet).	 But	 our	 realia	 are	 almost	 entirely	generated	by	protocols	or	projection	of	synchronic	methods	and	ideas	and	 theoretical	 positions	 back	 into	 the	 historical	 arena.	 Realist	reconstruction	was	 in	 fact	being	practiced	at	 least	since	 the	early	19th	century,	 without	 the	 issue	 of	 realism	 even	 arising	 (what	 else	 could	these	 things	 be	 but	 real?).	 When	 Grimm	 (1822)	 invented	 the	 formal	notion	of	Lautverschiebung,	 he	assumed	 that	 ‘things’	of	 some	sort	 like	
tenues	(stops)	and	aspirata	(aspirates,	actually	his	name	for	fricatives)	had	 taken	 part	 in	 the	 shift,	 that	 these	 things	 had	 locations	 as	well	 as	manners	of	articulation	(labiales,	gutturales).		Further,	they	moved	from	one	stricture	degree	(Stufe	 ‘grade’)	 to	another	within	a	real	space.	For	him	the	past	had	an	ontology.9	On	 the	other	hand,	 there	 is	a	 famous	and	 influential	view	 that	 the	primary	realia	themselves	are	not	the	outputs	of	reconstructive	praxis,	but	only	 their	 relations	are.	Meillet,	under	 the	 influence	of	his	mentor	Saussure,	posited	an	 influential	 view	of	 this	kind,	 later	developed	and	made	 more	 explicit	 by	 others.	 He	 denied	 that	 the	 major	 types	 of	reconstructed	 object	 that	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 suitable	 for	 ontic	interpretation	(segments,	tones,	words)	were	real.	In	the	larger	project	of	history	their	potential	material	values	were	important	only	insofar	as	they	 defined	 relations	 within	 systems,	 and	 their	 historical	 value	 was	apparently	 solely	 instrumental.	 What	 was	 real	 for	 him	 would	 in	 the	commonsense	view	be	even	less	real	than	a	reconstructed	phone(me):	it	was	an	abstraction	with	no	possible	material	existence.	In	 a	 methodological	 exposition	 of	 comparative	 method	 (1964	[1937],	41–2),	Meillet	gives	examples	like	skr.	dh	=	gr.	θ	=	arm.	d	=	germ.	d	and	describes	the	meaning	of	his	praxis	this	way	(p.	47):	“On	pourra	convenir	 de	 designer”10	 such	 a	 correspondence	 set	 as	 *dh,	 and	 if	 we	wished	call	it	an	“occlusive	sonore”11.	Then	comes	what	appears	to	be	a	complete	reversal:	“les	‘restitutions’	ne	sont	que	les	signes	par	lesquels	on	 exprime	 en	 abrégé	 les	 correspondences”12.	 Further,	 they	 do	 not	precisely	 represent	 spoken	 language:	 he	 says	 sarcastically	 that	 Indo-European	 cannot	 be	 reconstructed	 “tel	 qu’il	 a	 été	 parlé”13	 —	 as	 if																																																									
9	See	the	discussion	in	Lass	(2015a,	section	4.2).	10	“we	could	agree	to	designate”	(translations	mine	[RL])	11	“sonorant	stop”	12	“‘reconstructions’	are	nothing	but	signs	by	which	we	summarise	correspondences”	13	“just	as	it	was	spoken”	
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anyone	ever	thought	seriously	that	it	could.	Rather,	reconstructed	Indo-European	 is	 only	 “un	 système	 défini	 de	 correspondances	 entre	 des	
langues	historiquement	attestées”14	(p.	47,	italics	Meillet’s).	Meillet	 claimed	 to	 hold	 the	 Saussurean	 position	 that	 phonetics	 is	not	part	of	 linguistics	 (even	 though	he	used	phonetic	argument	 in	 the	same	way	as	Saussure	did	in	his	own	reconstructive	work),15	and	some	of	 his	 most	 brilliant	 analyses	 concern	 phonetic	 realities.		He	believed	that	what	really	counted	in	reconstructing	systems	was	not	the	 properties	 of	 their	 individual	 members	 (which	 were	 of	 no	 real	interest)	but	what	 later	came	to	be	called	 in	a	post-Jakobsonian	mode	their	‘mere	otherness’.	In	the	later	structuralist	tradition	this	even	came	to	 be	 taken	 as	 the	 ‘signifiant’	 of	 the	 phoneme	 itself	 (van	 Schooneveld	1996,	30).	The	 radical	 structuralist	 anti-phonetic	 position	 is	 summed	 up	explicitly	 by	 Kuryłowicz,	 in	 a	 rather	 bizarre	 definition	 of	 ‘linguistic’	(1964,	11,	emphasis	his):	Physiological	 speculations	 […]	 do	 not	 grasp	 the	 linguistic	 essence	 of	 […]	changes,	the	shift	of	the	internal	relations	of	the	elements	in	question	being	the	only	pertinent	 fact.	Once	we	 leave	 language	 sensu	 stricto	 and	appeal	 to	extralinguistic	factors,16	a	clear	delimitation	of	the	field	of	language	research	is	lost.	In	 fact	 he	 says	 (1964:12)	 that	 “the	 accumulating	 deviations	 from	traditional	 pronunciation	 are	 not	 linguistic	 changes”;	 only	phonemicisations	 are.	 The	 first	 question	 to	 ask	 is	 precisely	what	 it	 is	that	 becomes	 phonemicised,	 and	 how	 if	 not	 by	 phonetic	 changes	 that	make	it	contrastive.	Another	issue	that	does	not	seem	to	be	problematic	in	 this	 kind	 of	 structuralism	 is	 this:	 how	 is	 it	 that	 given	 a	 set	 like	{Sanskrit	 pitar-,	 Latin	 pater,	 Old	 English	 fæder,	 German	 Vater},	supposedly	 reconstructed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 pure	 ‘relations’,	 we	 always	
																																																								
14	“a	precise	system	of	correspondences	among	the	historically	attested	languages”	15	 Cf.	 Saussure	 (1879).	 For	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 Saussure’s	 ultimate	 epistemicism	with	 regard	 to	 history,	 and	 exclusion	 of	 a	 notion	 of	 phonetic	 change	 (in	 fact	 of	phonetics)	from	‘scientific’	linguistics,	see	Joseph	(2012,	380-88).	16	This	 is	an	 interesting	utterance	 for	 the	man	who	developed	the	roots	of	 laryngeal	theory	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 partly	 phonetic	 interpretation	 of	 Hittite	 orthography.	Specifically	 the	 fact	 of	 something	 being	 in	 a	 word-position	 where	 nothing	 was	previously	reconstructed,	and	having	these	previous	zeroes	develop	into	objects	that	define	properties	like	vowel	quantity	and	quality.		Note	the	Saussurean	echo,	taken	as	normal	for	historical	linguistic	research,	and	particularly	reconstruction.	For	an	even	more	extreme	view	see	Zawadoski	(1962),	and	the	discussion	of	his	reconstructional	praxis	in	Lass	(1993).	
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	seem	to	come	out	with	a	labial	initial?17	This	is	profoundly	disingenuous	(the	term	would	apply	both	to	Meillet	and	Kuryłowicz);	 there	 is	really	no	 way	 of	 avoiding	 phonetic	 operations,	 even	 in	 something	 as	apparently	 basic,	 and	 to	 the	 structuralist	 imagination	 abstract,	 as	constructing	phoneme	systems.		Phonology	 without	 phonetics	 is	 perverse.18	 Though	 many	distinguished	 linguists	have	come	close	 to	 taking	 this	kind	of	position	about	 the	 past,	 few	 have	 managed	 to	 hold	 it	 consistently.	 Even	 the	hyperstructuralists	 for	 the	most	 part	 drift	 into	 phonetic	 praxis	 when	necessary.	 But	 we	 can	 argue	 rationally	 that	 reconstructed	 linguistic	objects	of	any	kind	must	be	realist,	and	realist	in	a	particular	way.	Here	is	an	excellent	recent	statement	of	why	this	must	be	the	case	(Anthony	&	Ringe	2015,	199):	[…]	 each	 protolanguage	 that	 we	 reconstruct	 must	 be	 an	 approximation	 of	some	real	 language	spoken	by	a	real	community,	 for	 two	different	reasons.	One	 basis	 of	 our	 confidence	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 ‘comparative	 method’	 by	which	we	reconstruct	protolanguages:	 it	exploits	the	observed	regularity	of	sound	change	by	means	of	 simple	mathematics,	yielding	categorical	 results	that	 can	 be	 replicated	 by	 other	 researchers	 and	 checked	 both	 for	 internal	consistency	 and	 against	 information	 from	 other	 sources	 […].	 The	 other	reason	for	our	confidence	is	the	Uniformitarian	Principle	(UP)	[…]	As	usually	applied	 in	 linguistics,	 the	 UP	 holds	 that	 unless	 external	 conditions	 can	 be	shown	to	have	changed	in	some	way	that	can	be	proved	to	have	an	impact	on	human	language,	we	must	assume	that	the	structures	of	past	 languages	[…]	fell	within	the	same	ranges	as	 those	of	 languages	that	can	still	be	observed	and	studied	[...]	If	 this	 is	 so,	 then	 realism	of	a	 fairly	ordinary	kind	 in	 fact	becomes	necessary:	If	 straightforward	mathematical	 reconstruction	yields	 a	 grammar	 fragment	that	 falls	 within	 the	 observed	 range	 for	 modern	 native	 languages,	 we	 can	reasonably	infer	that	it	corresponds	to	some	real	language	of	the	past	spoken	by	 some	 real	 speech	 community,	 because	 experience	 shows	 that	 living	languages	do	not	exist	apart	from	native	speech	communities.		If	we	accept	this	line	of	argument,	then	when	we	describe	languages	existing	only	as	reconstructed,	or	much	the	same	thing,	only	in	written	or	epigraphic	form,	there	must	be	some	‘substance’	to	our	descriptions																																																									
17	Except	in	the	cases	of	Old	Irish	athir,	Armenian	hayr,	where	the	loss	in	one	case	and	lenition	in	another	have	to	be	described	phonetically.	18	A	relatively	recent	example	of	this	was	the	(now	fortunately	forgotten	as	far	as	I	can	tell)	non-phonetic	 ‘phonology’	of	 James	Foley	(e.g.	1977),	 in	which	names	like	 ‘velar’	were	said	to	represent	abstract,	pure	phonological	properties,	but	always	seemed	to	turn	out	as	things	like	[k,	g,	x].	
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of	the	objects	we	cause	to	emerge	from	the	past.	In	doing	etymologies19	or	 filiations	 based	 on	 such	 objects,	 we	 have	 to	 assign	 a	 specified	‘thinghood’	 to	whatever	 it	 is	 that	 becomes	whatever	 else.	 At	 least	we	have	 to	 for	 our	 talk	 to	 have	 any	 interesting	 content.	 If	 we	 take	 the	hyperstructuralist	 view	 that	 phonemes	 are	 ‘mere	 otherness’,	 then	we	could	call	the	elements	constituting	systems	@	and	&;	and	as	long	as	@	contrasts	with	&	at	t1	and	there	is	a	merger	in	&	at	t2	we	could	write	an	etymological	 sequence	@	 >	 &,	 and	 incorporate	 it	 into	 a	 history.	 This	would	of	course	be	of	no	interest	 in	terms	of	an	actual	subject	matter.	The	 pure	 structuralist	 interpretation	 of	 past	 objects	 and	 their	behaviour	 in	 history	 is	 intellectually	 empty.	 ‘The	 past	 is	 a	 foreign	country’	of	course,	but	the	uniformitarian	principle	says	it	has	to	look	a	lot	like	the	present.	But	 what	 kind	 of	 reality	 do	 past	 objects	 have?	 Let	 us	 take	 the	simplest	case,	 reconstruction	of	a	protoform	on	 the	basis	of	a	cognate	set.	 If	 reconstructions	 are	 realia,	 what	 does	 the	 asterisk	 allow	 us	 to	posit?	My	example	here	is	the	initial	segment	of	the	Indo-European	root	meaning	‘heart’	and	its	fate	in	Germanic.	The	correspondence	set	{Latin	
cord-,	 Old	 Irish	 cride,	 Old	 English	 heorte,	 Old	 Norse	 hjarta},	 using	standard	 procedures,	 makes	 us	 reconstruct	 PIE	 *kerd-,	 and	 then	 via	Grimm’s	 Law	 Proto-Germanic	 *xert-.	 The	 operation	 involves	 phonetic	claims.	Most	simply,	we	appear	to	be	saying	that	in	some	way	(leaving	off	the	stars	for	the	moment)	there	was	a	historical	phonetic	narrative	like	 this:	 the	 actual	 phonetic	 element	 [k]	 became	 [x].	 (It	 would	 seem	impossible	 for	 something	 to	 become	 something	 else	 unless	 both	 had	some	 real	 existence.)	 In	 early	 Old	 English	 the	 orthographical	 h-	 may	have	stood	for	either	[x]	or	[h];	in	late	Old	English	there	is	no	doubt	that	it	 was	 [h],	 as	 it	 is	 now	 in	 those	 English	 dialects	 where	 it	 survives.	 I	deliberately	used	this	example	because	there’s	an	uncertainty,	and	that	is	due	to	what	can	only	be	a	phonetic	question.	If	everything	starts	with	PIE	 [k]	 and	 then	 we	 get	 Proto-Germanic	 [x],	 we	 have	 to	 invoke	 a	subnarrative,	to	get	[x]	to	[h].	And	all	these	operations,	which	are	part	of	 a	 filiation	 and	 in	 fact	 a	 major	 part	 the	 definition	 of	 Germanic,	 are	purely	 phonetic.	 We	 not	 only	 have	 to	 give	 the	 ultimate	 protoform	 a	
phonetic	shape,	we	have	to	claim	that	the	Grimm’s	Law	spirantisation	of	voiceless	stops,	whose	input	was	[k],	had	an	output	[x],	and	that	 in	all	the	 Germanic	 dialects,	 initially	 before	 a	 vowel,	 at	 some	 point	 this	
																																																								
19	Etymologies	in	the	narrative	sense	of	the	Corpus	of	Narrative	Etymologies	(CoNE),	not	in	the	Greenbergian	sense	of	clusters	of	things	that	look	similar	if	you	stare	hard,	or	even	 in	 the	classic	historical	dictionary	sense	of	collections	of	 (properly	 justified)	cognates	and	comments,	and	perhaps	projection	of	a	protoform.	
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	became	 [h].20	 Not	 only	 are	 the	 segmental	 outputs	 unproblematically	real,	 so	are	 the	processes	 that	generate	 them.	And	at	 this	stage	of	our	reconstruction	 the	 systems	 these	 elements	 exist	 in	 are	 of	 no	 interest:	that	 kind	 of	 theoretical	 interpretation	 can	 come	 only	 after	 the	 realist	interpretation	of	what	we	have	reconstructed.	(In	fact	the	existence	of	reconstructed	 systems	 is	 fully	 dependent	 on	 that	 of	 surface	 phonetic	realities.)	The	way	through	structuralist	obfuscation	then	is	to	instantiate	the	Anthony	 &	 Ringe	 characterisation,	 which	 I	 take	 as	 now	 canonical:	 a	reconstructed	language	(and	therefore	all	 the	elements	 in	 it	and	all	 its	behaviours,	at	all	levels)	“corresponds	to	some	real	language”.	We	now	have	to	specify	what	“corresponds	to”	might	mean	in	practice.	How	do	we	assign	a	substantial	phonetic	value	to	a	reconstructed	segment?	One	way	 is	 via	 a	 thought	 experiment	 that	 we	 might	 call	 ‘projected	transcriptional	 response’.	 Let	 us	 reconstruct	 *x	 (and	 as	we	must	 now	call	 it,	 a	 velar)21	 for	 some	 category	 in	 a	 dead	 language.	 (Whether	orthographically	 attested	 or	 not	 is	 irrelevant.)	 We	 would	 then	 be	making	 a	 reality	 claim	 that	 at	 present	 (ever?)	 can	 be	 tested	 only	 in	principle,	or	(see	below)	indirectly.	But	in	general	such	claims	allow	us	to	 tell	 useful	 stories	 that	 possess	 the	 best	 attribute	 a	 hypothesis	 can	have:	 not	 truth	 but	 verisimilitude.	 Assuming	we	 are	 properly	 trained	phoneticians,	 we	 should	 have	 to	 transcribe	 an	 utterance	 of	 *x,	 if	 we	came	 to	 hear	 one,	 as	 some	 kind	 of	 back	 fricative,	 and	 in	 fact	 our	transcription	 of	 it	 as	 *x	 means	 that	 we	 are	 making	 that	 ontological	claim.	 A	 characterisation	 and	 partial	 justification	 might	 go	 like	 this	(Lass	2015b,	120):	All	our	symbols	are	‘broad’,	but	some	are	broader	than	others.	The	level	we	choose	might	 best	 be	 called	 ‘poorly	 resolved	 broad’	 transcription	 (Laing	&	Lass	 2003,	 264),	 which	 is	 in	 general,	 I	 think,	 the	 right	 way	 to	 represent	historical	 sound	 substance.	 That	 is,	 we	 hope	 that	 our	 reconstructions	 are	well	enough	supported	so	that	if	a	responsible	phonetician	equipped	with	a	time-machine	 were	 able	 to	 hear	 the	 items	 represented,	 the	 symbol	 in	question	 would	 not	 be	 too	 outlandish	 a	 transcriptional	 response.	 This	 is	partly	standard	wishful	thinking,	and	partly	our	assessment	of	the	results	of	work	in	comparative	and	historical	linguistics	over	the	past	two	centuries.																																																									
20	It	is	not	entirely	clear	when	the	second	lenition	of	*k	occurred.	The	first	unequivocal	data	 is	 from	 the	 early	 8th	 century.	 See	CoNE,	 CC	 s.v.	 ((XW1)).	Note	 that	we	 are	 also	invoking	 an	 ontological	 claim	 by	 assigning	 *x	 a	 location	 in	 real	 (if	 hard	 to	 specify)	time.	 There	 are	 cases	 of	 course	where	 the	 distances	 are	 too	 great	 for	 us	 to	 do	 this	(when	 did	 Grimm’s	 Law	 start?),	 but	 in	 such	 instances	 we	 can	 locate	 reconstructed	items	 relatively	 (Verner’s	 Law	 had	 to	 follow	 the	 Grimm’s	 Law	 spirantisation	 of	voiceless	stops).	21	Of	course	in	any	given	variety	this	category	might	be	uvular;	*x	really	stands,	most	safely,	for	a	back	fricative.	
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We	 could	 then	 check	 this	 imagined	 response	 against	 present	 day	languages	 in	 the	same	family	 for	which	we	would	want	 to	reconstruct	*x.	To	avoid	 the	special	 complications	of	 initial	position,	 let	us	 look	at	those	languages	that	have	a	dorsal	fricative	in	another	place	where	we	would	 reconstruct	 *x:	 say	 the	words	 for	 ‘night’	 (all	 certainly	 cognate,	with	 a	 framework	 Proto-Germanic	 *nVxt	 <	 Indo-European	 *nVkt-)	 in	German,	 Dutch	 and	 Scots.	 Here	 the	 *x	 position	 in	 the	 present	 day	spoken	 languages	 is	 occupied	 by	 [x]	 or	 [χ]	 or	 [ç].22	 We	 have	reconstructed	 objects	 that	 show	 by	 their	 reflexes	 that	 they	 were	particular	realia,	and	further	justify	the	realist	claim.	This	would	seem	to	be	necessary	if	the	classical	expression	ex	nihilo	nihil	fit	23	is	true,	or	true	enough	to	be	part	of	a	uniformitarian	theory.24	We	can	take	this	ontological	commitment	it	a	step	further.	Is	there	a	case	 for	 adding	 objects	 to	 a	 reconstructed	 pathway	 supported	 not	 by	actual	 elements,	 but	 rather	 by	 principle?	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 a	 realist	framework,	can	objects	(in	this	case	phonetic	objects)	be	reconstructed	safely	ex	nihilo	(apparently)?	I	think	we	are	at	times	forced	to	do	this	by	the	 Uniformitarian	 Principle.	 Take	 for	 example	 a	 clear	 cognation	involving	[k]	and	zero,	with	no	other	items.	Can	we	turn	the	cognation	into	 a	 change	 [k]	 >	 ∅	 directly?	 The	 uniformitarian	 answer	 is	 almost	certainly	 no,	 because	 in	 observed	 languages25	 this	 does	 not	 usually	happen.	Voiceless	 stops,	 except	 in	 certain	 fast	 speech	processes,	most	commonly	 delete	 only	 via	 a	 lenition	 sequence	 in	which	 [h]	 is	 the	 last	stage	before	zero,	i.e.	the	uniformitarian	pathway	is	[k]	>	[x]	>	[h]	>	∅.	And	in	English,	the	one	language	which	shows	zero	in	the	fricative	position	in	‘night’,	there	is	also	clear	but	little-known	evidence	not	only	for	[x]	in	some	dialects	(e.g.	Scots),	but	of	a	stage	[h]	varying	with	zero	in	the	16th	and	17th	centuries	 in	this	class	of	words	(night,	bright,	etc.:	see	Lass	1999,	section	3.5.1).	This	allows	us	to	turn	our	reconstructive	hypothesis	 into	 a	 prediction	 through	 the	 testimony	 of	 contemporary	phoneticians.	 And	 we	 also	 know	 that	 in	 the	 relevant	 period	 the	 data																																																									
22	The	 fact	 that	 in	 some	 languages	 in	 some	positions	 the	 reflex	of	our	 *x	 is	prevelar	makes	it	even	more	real	in	a	sense,	as	it	has	to	have	been	back	to	have	assimilated	to	nonback.	As	does	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 *xt	 shows	up	as	 a	 long	 (‘geminate’)	 consonant	 in	Swedish	natt	[natː],	which	shows	again	that	there	has	to	have	been	a	real	object	in	that	position.	23	“nothing	comes	from	nothing”	24	 There	 is	 at	 least	 one	 exception	 to	 this,	 and	 that	 is	 in	 phonotactically	 rather	 than	phonetically	motivated	epenthesis,	e.g.	the	insertion	of	initial	e	in	Spanish	to	disallow	initial	 [sC]	 clusters:	 escorbuto	 ’scurvy’	 <	 Latin	 scorbūtus.	 This	 is	 produced	 not	 by	copying	of	features,	but	by	a	pure	phonotactic	constraint	in	which	the	vowel	appears	out	of	nowhere	and	has	no	etymological	ancestor.	25	At	least	those	I	happen	to	know	of,	which	for	all	linguists	counts	as	‘universally’.	
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	gives	us	the	variation	in	a	change	in	progress	which	the	uniformitarian	principle	also	predicts.	So	this	successful	prediction	adds	an	element	of	verisimilitude	 to	 a	 hypothesis	 whose	 elements	 derive	 purely	 from	 a	theoretical	 claim.	 And	 at	 nowhere	 in	 this	 procedure	 are	 ‘systems’	 of	contrasting	‘others’	necessary	—	they	may	well	be	interesting,	but	they	are	totally	derivative	of,	and	make	sense	only	in	terms	of,	the	phonetic	realities.	So	 the	 choice	 then	 of	 real-language-like	 outputs	 of	 reconstruction	and	 uniformitarianism,	 here	 applied	 to	 process	 as	 well	 as	 structure,	gives	 us	 what	 looks	 like	 a	 full	 and	 unproblematic	 vindication	 of	 a	realism	as	radical	as	structuralist	instrumentalism.	And,	to	quote	one	of	the	 greatest	 non-structuralist	 linguists	 of	 our	 age,	 phonetics,	 rather	than	being	a	separate	discipline,	is	in	fact	“the	indispensable	foundation	of	all	study	of	language”	(Sweet	1877,	b).26		
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26	 In	the	preface	to	Sweet	(1877),	 the	first	page	of	which	this	quotation	comes	from,	the	recto	is	not	numbered,	but	only	has	a	‘b’	at	the	bottom.	The	verso	is	‘vi’.	
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